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So far, international climate policy has been ineffective in curbing the rise of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-sions. Still, ambitious climate targets such as the 2  °C target 
require a phase-out of global emissions by the end of the century, 
and an active participation of all world regions in climate policy1. 
Given the many obstacles to global cooperative action on climate 
change, the question remains how diverse national climate policies 
can be coordinated and strengthened globally. Within the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action2 provides an impor-
tant platform for a post-2020 international climate agreement. It 
contains several innovative elements, most notably a focus on the 
major economies that goes beyond the traditional divide between 
Annex I and non-Annex I countries. The Durban platform calls for 
a new climate treaty to be agreed in 2015 and implemented as early 
as 2020. The recently announced United States–China climate deal 
and the EU 2030 climate framework provide encouraging steps for-
wards, but aligning the incentives of the major emitters in pursuing 
stringent climate policies remains a challenge. In this Review, we 
aim at assessing the implications of post-2020 climate policies with 
specific reference to the major economies. We provide quantitative 
estimates of regional emission budgets, timing of emission peaking, 
and distribution of mitigation costs. We examine the role of carbon 
markets and different burden sharing schemes to alleviate distribu-
tional inequalities and finance the investment needs in low carbon 
mitigation technologies. In order to quantify these policy-relevant 
variables, we resort to global models.
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are tools designed to inves-
tigate the implications of achieving climate and other objectives in 
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an integrated and rigorous framework. They are numerical models 
that account for major interactions among energy, land-use, eco-
nomic and climate systems. Models differ in the economic, techno-
logical and sectoral representation and in the way they are solved, 
with some models maximizing an intertemporal objective function 
(such as economic activity) and others simulating a set of equilibria 
(see the Supplementary Material for individual model description 
and references to documentation). Models generate global long-
term scenarios for a number of regions or countries that can be used 
to inform climate and energy policies and to translate long-term 
climate objectives into potential medium-term courses of action3–9. 
Scenarios from IAMs provide important input to scientific reviews 
such as the assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) Emissions Gap Report. Given the focus of 
this review on climate mitigation policies, the models reviewed are 
used to assess the implications of cost-effective policies to achieve 
a given climate goal (like in the IPCC), rather than to determine 
the appropriate ambition of such a goal in a cost–benefit setting. 
In other words, the potential damages from climate change costs 
are not considered explicitly here, setting our analysis outside the 
controversial discussion regarding climate impacts and the social 
cost of carbon.
In order to generate conclusions that are robust to different 
models’ specifications, IAM teams have engaged in model inter-
comparison projects (MIPs), in which a variety of models imple-
ment a common study protocol. Although cross-model comparison 
literature has developed fast, it has so far mostly reported on global 
issues6,10–12. Information from a MIP regarding the regional impacts 
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of post-2020 climate policies is limited. This Review aims at synthe-
sizing insights from the most comprehensive MIP on this subject, 
the LIMITS project13–15. Box 1 provides information about the pol-
icy dimensions we assess. Although other MIPs have explored the 
role of fragmented regional mitigation effort and staged accession 
to climate cooperation (EMF2216, AMPERE17, EMF271), globally 
delayed participation (RECIPE18, ROSE19, AMPERE11) and burden-
sharing schemes (RECIPE20), none except for LIMITS has focused 
on potential outcomes of the Durban platform negotiations: that is, 
a period of fragmented moderate climate policy followed by global 
cooperative action under different assumptions about burden-shar-
ing regimes. In addition, in LIMITS results are reported at a high 
regional resolution (for 10 regional aggregates that best match the 
native model regions), short-term climate and energy policies are 
well detailed, the likelihood of achieving the 2 °C target is relatively 
harmonized across model scenarios (using the MAGICC climate 
model) and a new burden-sharing scheme is introduced and evalu-
ated. Although we will use LIMITS as guiding example throughout 
the paper, the insights are framed by and compared with all the rel-
evant literature on climate policy modelling21–27. 
Regional mitigation strategies
One of the most valuable uses of integrated assessment models is 
in the translation of mitigation policies into climate outcomes, and 
conversely the translation of global climate objectives into regional 
commitments and timing of emission reductions. This allows the 
‘when’ and ‘where’ questions that are key elements of climate policy 
considerations to be addressed.
Figure 1 provides insights into the ‘when’ question, reporting the 
year of peaking of greenhouse gas emissions in 10 major economies 
for different policies (see Supplementary Table S1 for a definition of 
the 10 regional aggregates). The emission peak year is an important 
indicator for policy, as it signals by when emissions should start to 
fall. Without explicit mitigation policies, models project emissions 
to increase over the century in essentially all regions, although with 
significant model variation. This result is based on the expecta-
tion of continued economic growth and availability of fossil fuels. 
Mitigation pledges, based on extrapolation of the currently dis-
cussed targets28, would lead to differentiated peak years that depend 
on the stringency of the commitment and on the growth of baseline 
emissions29. Industrialized economies are projected to keep emis-
sions below current levels, but several developing country regions 
would see emissions rising until the second half of the century. 
Emissions in China would peak slightly later than 2030. It should 
be remarked that not all policy targets are included in the pledge 
scenario: for example, in the recently announced US–China deal, in 
addition to peaking emissions in 2030, China also pledged to meet 
20% of energy demand with non-fossil sources. Depending on the 
metric used to convert nuclear and renewables into primary energy, 
this target is in line with what the LIMITS models foresee in the 
pledge or 2 °C scenarios. 
In any case, a marked difference is observable when moving 
to climate stabilization targets around 2 °C. In order to minimize 
Figure 1 | Emission peaking time. Year of regional maximum emissions 
(Kyoto gases; markers show median across models, and lines show 
10th–90th percentile ranges). ‘2100’ denotes an increasing emissions 
trajectory throughout the twenty-first century until the end of the time 
horizon of the models. Models report information typically in 5-10 year 
steps. Full set of results by model is available in Supplementary Fig. S1.
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International climate policy involves complicated negotiations 
among different parties over a wide range of activities. As inter-
national climate agreements are voluntary, they need to be 
self-enforcing. The formation of such deals can be studied by 
model-based analysis of the incentives for joining or leaving these 
agreements. This has led to a specific strand of literature based on 
game theory and strategic interaction85–90, which includes IAM 
applications91–96. More often, though, the formation mechanism of 
the policy agreement is taken as given. Models explore the implica-
tions of regional or global policies, comparing them, for instance, 
with a counterfactual world in which such policies are absent.
The LIMITS MIP can be used to illustrate how this is done in 
practice. A set of scenarios are implemented in the six participat-
ing models (GCAM, IMAGE, MESSAGE, REMIND, TIAM-ECN, 
WITCH). These include (1) the extent and date of implementation 
of climate and energy policies, (2) the stringency of the regional 
emission pledges, (3) the long-term climate objective, and (4) 
the way the climate policy burden is shared across regions (see 
Supplementary Table S2 for the scenario description). First of all, 
a counterfactual scenario with no climate policies is built (‘No 
Policies’). Second, the study analyses a reference case representing 
the current situation of regionally fragmented mitigation efforts, 
based on extrapolation of the strengthened Copenhagen pledges 
throughout the whole century (‘Pledges’; see Supplementary Table 
S3 for their exact definition). In addition, a successful outcome of 
the Durban Platform negotiations is modelled by global coopera-
tion after 2020 on either a long-term CO2-equivalent concentra-
tion objective of 450 ppm-eq or 500 ppm-eq. Given the uncertainty 
surrounding climate change, each of these concentration levels 
produces a probability distribution of temperature outcomes. By 
using the MAGICC climate model, 450 and 500 ppm-eq targets 
were found to correspond to a likely (>66%) and as-likely-as-not 
(>50%) chance of achieving the 2 °C target respectively.
The stabilization scenarios are implemented in a cost-effective 
way, with emissions reduced where it is cheapest to do so. Different 
burden-sharing regimes across regions have been considered, to 
allow regions to be compensated for their emission reductions. 
Thus, in addition to the case of a globally harmonized carbon tax 
(without allowing for transfers between regions, we considered the 
assignment and trade of emissions permits based on either con-
vergence to equal per capita emissions or equalization of mitiga-
tion costs across regions (see Supplementary Table S2)).
Box 1 | International climate policy through the lens of IAMs.
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global costs, emissions would peak by the end of this decade in all 
major regions in order to have more than a 66% chance of limit-
ing temperature increase to 2 °C (that is, 450 ppm CO2-equivalent, 
ppm-eq). Relaxing the chances of meeting the 2 °C target to 50% (that 
is, 500 ppm-eq) would buy some time, of the order of 10–15 years for 
some developing countries. Reaching 2 °C after following the pledges 
until 2030 would still be feasible but would come at a significantly 
higher cost and transitional challenges13.
A useful metric for quantifying climate change is that of cumula-
tive emissions, or carbon budgets, which simply are the sum of emis-
sions over time. These have been shown to be good, linear predictors 
of global temperature increase30–32. The emission scenarios from the 
integrated assessment models provide a split into regional budgets 
under the assumption of cost-efficient implementation. Clearly, even 
under this assumption there is considerable uncertainty about the 
cost-effective regional split of emissions budgets as it depends on, 
inter alia, baseline emissions, regional mitigation potentials, differ-
ences in the global emissions reduction rate and terms of trade effects, 
all of which can vary substantially across models and regions14,16,33.
Figure  2 addresses the ‘where’ question by providing estimates 
about regional cumulative emission budgets, as well as the historical 
contribution to emissions of the major economies. It indicates that 
in the ‘No Policies’ scenario, unabated emissions of major emerging 
economies like China or regions such as the OECD would by them-
selves exhaust the entire global budget compatible with achieving 
the 2 °C target. A commitment to mitigation pledges would reduce 
regional carbon budgets, but not at the levels needed for 2 °C. Asia 
will generate future warming of approximately 1 °C, which is com-
parable to historical contributions, predominantly made by OECD 
countries. A limit of 2  °C would require a significant reduction of 
carbon budgets in all major economies. No major economy would 
have a budget bigger than a few hundred gigatonnes of CO2, most of 
it to be used in the first half of century assuming carbon neutrality 
in subsequent decades. When looking at all GHGs (Supplementary 
Fig. S3), budgets would increase for all regions, especially under the 
stringent climate scenarios, since non-CO2 gases are assumed to be 
harder to abate.
Figure 3 shows that cumulative emissions reductions relative to 
the No Policies scenario until 2050 consistent with the 2 °C target 
are quite similar across the major economies, around 40% (per-
centage numbers right to the bars). The contribution of emerging 
regions in terms of absolute GtCO2-equivalent emission reductions 
would be larger, given the higher projected baseline emissions in 
developing economies and in particular in Asia29.
IAMs can also be used to further inform about ‘how’ the regional 
mitigation effort might be achieved. Figure 3 indicates that accord-
ing to the LIMITS models the largest share of mitigation by sector 
would take place in the energy supply sector, confirming results from 
bottom-up and top-down studies12,13,34–38. In Latin America, Rest of 
Asia and Africa the land-use sector also plays a major role in abate-
ment, owing to the large potential for forest-based mitigation39,40. 
These estimates vary widely across models, because of uncertainties 
about the effectiveness of land-based mitigation measures. Middle 
East has the largest potential on the demand side. This is consistent 
with the currently high energy intensity, in turn related to relatively 
low energy prices. Non-CO2 gases contribute to 10–20% in terms of 
abatement, and represent a significant share of residual emissions, 
as some emissions such as CH4 and N2O gases from agriculture are 
hard to mitigate41. The overall picture is that, while energy supply 
has the highest mitigation potential, regional characteristics imply 
different patterns of mitigation across sectors42, which will also be 
influenced by the stringency of the climate target13,43.
Model variation is shown in Figs 1–3, and Supplementary Figs 
S1, S4 and S5. These indicate that the full cross-model range of 
Figure 2 | Regional carbon budgets. Cumulative CO2 emissions for the period 2010–2100 (bars show median across models; lines show 10th to 90th 
percentile ranges. Negative values are possible via negative emission technologies). Historical emissions are for the period 1751–2010 (source: Carbon 
Dioxide Information Analysis Center, cdiac.ornl.gov). The shaded area shows the world carbon budget range for 450 and 500 ppm-eq policies, median 
across models. Regional Kyoto budgets and full set of model results are available in Supplementary Figs S2 and S3 respectively.
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estimates can reflect significant spread, especially for some fac-
tors, such as land-use mitigation potential, and in some regions, 
such as developing countries like Africa. Although the main results 
seem to be robust to such uncertainty, model variability should 
not be underestimated. A risk-management approach that explic-
itly reflects structural uncertainties can provide policymakers with 
robust policy recommendations44, although it has not generally 
been adopted by IAM analyses so far45.
One of the most contentious topics in international climate 
negotiations is the distribution of the mitigation effort. Combined 
with emission trading, different allocation methods can incorpo-
rate different views of fairness while still resulting in an (almost) 
cost-optimal implementation; in IAMs economic efficiency and 
equity are either assumed to be independent or found to be largely 
so, owing to limited impact of income effects46. Despite this being a 
stylized approach that does not account for issues such as transac-
tion costs, property rights, resource curse and institutional capac-
ity, it nonetheless provides a convenient framework for thinking 
about the problem47. Many different allocation regimes have been 
proposed, mostly either based on the concepts of resource sharing 
(allocating the available emission space) or effort sharing (ensur-
ing similar effort, such as equal costs)48. Many studies have assessed 
the implications of different regimes for the allocation of mitiga-
tion efforts26,48,49, finding that allocations are influenced by both the 
equity principle adopted and the overall climate objective.
Figure 4 provides an example of how models project emissions 
allocations under different burden-sharing schemes and with the 
2 °C target as the climate objective. The actual emissions reductions 
that occur in cost-efficient scenarios assuming a globally harmo-
nized carbon price (left) are contrasted with emissions allowances 
based on two burden-sharing principles which aim to equalize per 
capita emissions allowances (by 2050) and regional mitigation costs, 
respectively (these represent examples of a resource-sharing and 
effort-sharing regime, respectively). If a region receives an allowance 
above (below) its actual emissions, it would still mitigate the same 
net emissions—given the equity-efficiency independence discussed 
above—but would be able to sell (buy) emission rights equal to the 
difference between emissions and allowances. The case where emis-
sions allowances exactly match domestic emissions reflects a situa-
tion where all mitigation efforts are financed domestically. Carbon 
markets can then be used to redistribute income (in accordance 
with some given principle) while preserving economic efficiency.
Figure 4 shows that for Europe and North America actual emis-
sions and allowances in the per capita case would be slightly lower 
than those announced in the major economies forum meeting of 
2009 (80–95% reductions over 1990). A per capita burden-sharing 
scheme would require a significant mitigation effort from China 
and some other regions such as the Middle East (in line with previ-
ous modelling studies14,20,50–52). The opposite would hold for India 
(and Africa, not shown), because of low per capita emissions. The 
equal-cost burden-sharing scheme in which all regions pay the same 
price in terms of GDP reduction would require a stronger commit-
ment from the OECD (close to 100% reduction) and an average 
50% reduction for China, while allowing India an increase (as with 
the equal per capita regime). The most marked change across the 
schemes would be for the Middle East: under an equal-cost scheme, 
it receives a much larger emission allocation to compensate for its 
higher mitigation costs, which would in part result from worse 
terms of trade for its fossil-fuel exports53.
Economic and financial implications
A key consideration in climate policy is how to distribute the eco-
nomic effort of GHG mitigation. Even if global mitigation costs were 
low, policymakers care and argue about the regional distribution of 
policy costs, as this affects economic development, competitiveness 
and even political stability. The scenarios indicate that the costs of 
mitigation will vary significantly across countries1,14,20,54–58. Figure 
5 portrays this finding for the LIMITS models, showing that—in 
a cost-effective framework with uniform carbon pricing but with-
out carbon trading or other compensatory transfers— mitigation 
costs in the OECD would be lower than global average, and the 
opposite would hold for developing economies, and especially for 
energy-exporting regions, which would face adverse terms-of-trade 
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Figure 4 | Emission targets. Actual emissions (left panel) and emissions 
allowances (centre and right panels), in percentage reductions in 2050 
from 2010 for a 450 ppm-eq target. The two panels on the right show 
examples of allocation schemes with resource sharing (convergence to 
equal per capita rights by 2050) and effort sharing (equalization of relative 
mitigation costs), respectively. Full permit trading is allowed (leading to the 
cost-minimizing distribution of abatement activity across regions).
Figure 3 | Sectoral mitigation. Sectoral share of cumulative mitigation 
(2010–2050, in CO2-equivalent using 100 year GWPs) of CO2 across 
sectors and non-CO2 for the 450 ppm-eq policy (bars show median across 
models; lines show 10th to 90th percentile ranges. Negative values show 
cases where sectoral emissions are higher in the policy scenario than in 
the baseline). The numbers to the right of each bar indicate the regional 
mitigation potential measured by median cumulative (2010–2050) Kyoto 
emission reductions (%) from the No Policies scenario (median across 
models). Full set of model results is available in Supplementary Fig. S4.
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effects1,20,58–60. This ranking is rather robust across climate targets, 
mitigation cost metrics and IAMs14,61, although the ranges are con-
siderably larger for developing economies.
The regressivity of regional costs can be attributed to several fac-
tors, but especially to emission intensity, abatement potential and 
international trade effects14,62–64. Using data from the EMF22 model 
comparison study, a higher ratio of emissions to GDP—the ‘emis-
sion intensity’—in the BAU has been shown to lead to lower mar-
ginal abatement costs but to higher total costs for a common carbon 
price62. Given the higher current and projected emission intensi-
ties of developing countries29, these regions will have higher total 
mitigation costs unless their abatement costs are significantly lower. 
Benefits from reduced warming and from other environmental 
issues such as local air pollution are likely to significantly affect the 
distribution of costs, but are not accounted for in this calculation.
The interregional distributional tension highlighted in Fig. 5 can 
be alleviated through emission endowments and trading. When the 
carbon budget is tight, however, as is the case for 2 °C policies, even 
resource-sharing schemes such as those based on per capita equali-
zation would not compensate for the inequality in favour of OECD 
countries14,65. A particular challenge lies in the uncertainty about the 
relations between regional emission allocation and costs, which is 
much greater than the uncertainty in global mitigation costs. This 
uncertainty is likely to be a key barrier to the implementation of 
an emissions trading scheme with national caps based on a long-
term burden-sharing scheme. Rather, a pragmatic approach featur-
ing various flexible mechanisms and a regular review of emission 
reduction and finance commitments seems more plausible22.
In addition to macroeconomic costs, an important question for 
policy is how to ensure investment flows. This relates to redirect-
ing investments from the fossil fuel industries to sectors involved 
in low carbon energy technologies and energy efficiency, and to 
ensure mitigation action in the different regions worldwide. Some 
studies have quantified the investment gaps to achieve climate sta-
bilization43,66–68, and found that a considerable reallocation of invest-
ments is required. As shown in Fig. 6, investments in the fossil fuel 
extraction sector would be greatly reduced. This compensates to 
a large extent for the additional investment needs in low-carbon 
energy (renewables, nuclear, bioenergy). Additional investment 
would be needed to improve energy efficiency, the transmission and 
distribution grid and the transition to low-carbon technologies in 
other sectors such as transport. The LIMITS results show, for exam-
ple, that investments in freely emitting fossil-power technologies 
remain substantial in the pledge scenarios, whereas they drop in the 
450 ppm-eq stabilization case. In particular, pledges would be insuf-
ficient to reduce investment in coal-fired power plants. But if the 
world credibly embarks on a path towards 450 ppm-eq stabilization, 
investors would largely shun further investment in coal plants, as 
shown in Supplementary Fig. S5.
Most of the investments would have to be made in developing 
countries where the largest absolute mitigation effort would take 
place. According to the model calculations, transitioning from a 
pledge policy to one fully compatible with the 2  °C target would 
require filling a global investment gap of about half a trillion US$ 
per year for the next 40  years, two-thirds of this in the develop-
ing economies. The gap would be even larger if the counterfactual 
scenario did not involve emission reduction pledges. In addition, 
investments in clean energy research and development would also 
need to be significantly scaled up, in order to prompt sufficient 
innovation in new technologies. Models estimate these to be about 
US$50–100 billion per year over the first half of this century69–73.
The current level of green energy investments, estimated at 
roughly US$250 billion in 2013 by Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 
falls significantly short of filling this gap. How can the rest be raised? 
Several opportunities exist. Removing energy subsidies would 
free up resources of the same order of magnitude as the gaps74,75. 
Moreover, all models find that climate policies could provide suf-
ficient fiscal revenues within each region to finance the totality of 
investment in energy supply, while also providing incentives to the 
private sector to raise finance76. Climate finance can assist develop-
ing economies in filling the investment gap and in alleviating the 
distributional inequalities. It is worth noting that the financing gap 
is not large relative to the increases in investment rates seen in sev-
eral major emerging-market economies, including China and India, 
over recent years. Such countries have the capacity if necessary 
to utilize domestic savings, although the question of whether this 
would be equitable would remain76.
Figure 6 suggests that revenues from the international sales of 
CO2 permits could cover almost half of the investment gap of devel-
oping economies, provided that industrialized countries committed 
to transfers of the order of US$150 billion per year. In order to work, 
however, a large and well-functioning carbon market would need to 
be established in the next 20 years, capable of handling permits for 
several GtCO2-equivalent and hundreds of billions of US dollars of 
trades per year14,55,58. Such an emission market would be an order 
of magnitude larger than the one currently supporting the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and would require strong institu-
tional support. These represent the types of barriers that are not ana-
lysed by IAMs. The experience with CDM has already highlighted 
implementation difficulties at a much lower level of ambition77.
Finally, IAM scenarios indicate that climate policies are likely to 
affect other objectives of policymakers; not all of these impacts are 
monetized in the models’ cost calculations. For example, climate 
policies would lead to reduced energy imports and increased energy 
independence in some major economies such as China, India and 
the EU. This would not be the case for the United States and current 
energy exporters78. Climate policies could also lead to more resilient 
energy systems in terms of diversity of energy options, preservation 
of fossil resource ‘buffers’ and decreased sensitivity to GDP fluc-
tuations53,79. Transformation pathways spurred by climate policies 
would also foster air pollution control80,81, with particular benefits 
for China and India82,83. Although the magnitude of co-benefits 
related to air quality is uncertain84, their current importance in 
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Figure 5 | Distribution of mitigation costs. Relative mitigation costs 
(percentage reduction of GDP) in each region divided by global mitigation 
costs (again in percentage reduction of GDP), for 450 ppm-eq without 
carbon trading and transfers. The line at 100 indicates the case in which 
all regions would face the same relative policy costs, as in the case of an 
‘equal cost’ burden-sharing scheme. GDP is discounted over the period 
2010–2100 at 5%.
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major economies such as China could lend support to post-2020 
climate policies.
Modelling input to the current negotiation process
The challenge of achieving a comprehensive agreement to reduce 
emissions is often portrayed as either insurmountable or simply a 
matter of lack of sufficient political will. Rigorous analysis of the 
implications of implementing mitigation measures can help in char-
acterizing the subtleties of this challenge, supporting a differenti-
ated view on the future of global climate policy and providing useful 
insights for policy design and on the negotiation process. Such an 
analysis needs to focus on all the key emitting regions and account for 
the uncertainties characterizing emission reduction opportunities.
In this Review, we show that scenarios generated by energy–
economy–climate models can help in this task, providing critical 
information to the ongoing policy debate on a post-2020 climate 
agreement. The use of MIPs can help to ensure that key uncertain-
ties are taken into account by using a diversity of different models 
and model assumptions. Reviewing a recent MIP focused on inter-
national climate policy in the context of broader literature, we relate 
short- and long-term climate objectives to key regional indicators 
such as peaking of emissions, carbon budgets and abatement poten-
tials. Our analysis highlights the main challenges in sharing the 
economic effort associated with reducing emissions equitably, while 
showing the importance of regional cooperation towards climate sta-
bilization. The importance and limitation of markets is highlighted. 
Global carbon markets can alleviate some—but not necessarily 
all—of the distributional tensions in climate change mitigation. 
They can also provide much-needed revenues for filling investment 
gaps in clean energy, and if possible achieving other societal goals. 
Nonetheless, additional policy instruments will be needed to attain 
the technological and behavioural transformations to achieve cli-
mate stabilization.
The currently discussed targets, including those announced in 
China, the EU and the United States, are important steps forward; 
our analyses indicate that additional and more comprehensive efforts 
would be needed if we hope to keep temperature from exceeding 
critical thresholds. Still, expanding and strengthening climate coop-
eration while aligning national interests is by no means straightfor-
ward. The numerical estimates by the MIPs reviewed here highlight 
some critical areas of the climate policy process, which include the 
regional diversity of mitigation opportunities and costs, the institu-
tional requirements for carbon markets, the best use of climate rev-
enues, the linkages with national policy priorities, and the relevance 
of clean technology innovation and diffusion. Progress in all these 
key areas will be needed to motivate enhanced national ambition in 
reducing emissions in the next decades.
This Review has assessed mitigation challenges and opportunities 
without considering the regional benefits of reducing GHG emis-
sions, mostly because a robust quantification of the latter is not yet 
available in the literature. Similarly, some potential additional strate-
gies for dealing with climate change, such as mitigation of short-lived 
gases, adaptation and geo-engineering, have not been considered in 
these model exercises. We hope that these topics will also be exam-
ined in the near future, using similar common protocols and making 
use of a large number of integrated assessment models.
Received 31 March 2014; accepted 21 November 2014; published 
online 15 December 2014.
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